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THE RULE OF LAW AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS* 
Luke K. Cooperriderf 
A N anecdote which I believe I recall from one of Professor Bro-gan's ·writings concerns a conversation between the archbishop 
and the chief justice about the relative importance of their respec-
tive powers. After the conversation had continued for some time 
the archbishop sought to administer the coup de grace. "I have the 
advantage of you, your lordship, because you see, in the long run, 
the most you can say to a man is, 'You shall be hanged!' whereas it 
is within the functions of my office to say, 'You shall be damned!' " 
To this, after a moment of thought, the chief justice replied, "Yes, 
your worship, your point is persuasive. But you overlook one mat-
ter. In the long run, if, I say 'You shall be hanged,' -you will be 
hanged." 
The point which this anecdote rather remotely suggests, and 
which I wish to pursue today, is that the judge, too, is a center of 
power. He too is capable of action which may bear very heavily 
upon the individual. It is therefore appropriate to inquire into 
his exercise of this power, and the limits which the Rule of Law 
concept may or may not erect about him. I hasten to add that 
in so doing I am directing your attention to a small fraction of the 
whole meaning which has been found in the expression which is 
the subject for our series of lectures. Professor Harvey dealt with 
the concept broadly, and in historical depth yesterday, suggesting 
many of the problems of definition which are involved, and par-
ticularly calling to your attention the need for external standards 
of criticism for the law itself. Knowing that this was his assignment, 
and that four other lecturers would follow after me to consider 
other special applications of the idea, I have felt secure in going 
today to what we might call the internal operation of the Rule of 
Law in the context of the judicial process. 
After examining a fraction of the literature on the subject, 
one would have to conclude that the meaning of the expression is 
elusive. Some ·writers have defined it rather carefully - but in 
somewhat inconsistent terms. For others it seems to have a meaning 
roughly equivalent to "good government." It would be my guess 
that judges and laivyers have always been its most enthusiastic 
• Lecture delivered on June 22, 1960, as part of a series of lectures on the general topic, 
"Post-War Thinking About the Rule of Law," given in connection with the Special Sum-
mer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 
June 20-July 1, 1960.-Ed. 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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votaries, for it seems to creep into the balance on the side of the 
judges in any contest in which they may be involved, and emerges 
primarily as a limitation upon the executive and legislative 
branches of government. A recent example of this interpretation of 
its role is to be found in the Declaration of Delhi, promulgated in 
1959 by an international congress of jurists consisting of 185 judges, 
practicing lawyers and teachers of law from 53 countries, which 
states the conclusions of that august assemblage on the Rule of Law 
and the administration of justice throughout the world. The Dec-
laration contains a praiseworthy list of prescriptions for the legisla-
ture, which must not discriminate in its laws on the basis of race, 
religion or sex, must not interfere with freedom of religious belief 
and observance, must not deny to the members of society the right 
to elected, responsible government, must not place restrictions on 
freedom of speech, assembly and association, must abstain from 
retroactive legislation, must not impair the exercise of fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual, and must provide procedural 
machinery and safeguards whereby the above-mentioned freedoms 
are given effect and protected. There is concern also for the execu-
tive, that any delegation to it of legislative power should be nar-
rowly limited, carefully defined, and subject to judicial review, that 
its acts generally which directly affect personal rights should be 
subject to review, that any person injured by an illegal executive 
act should have his remedy against the state or against the wrong-
doing official, that hearing procedures should be established ante-
cedent to executive action, and there is most particular concern 
with criminal procedures. When the congress turns its attention 
to the judicial branch, however, the atmosphere suddenly clears; 
the aura of suspicion is dispersed. Permit me to quote from the 
Declaration itself: 
"An independent Judiciary is an indispensable requisite of 
a free society under the Rule of Law. Such independence 
implies freedom from interference by the Executive or Legis-
lative with the exercise of the judicial function, but does not 
mean that the judge is entitled to act in an arbitrary manner. 
His duty is to interpret the law and the fundamental prin-
ciples and assumptions that underlie it. It is implicit in the 
concept of independence set out in the present paragraph that 
provision should be made for the adequate remuneration of 
the judiciary ... " 
and the Declaration then continues, to concern itself only with 
methods of appointment and removal of judges, their tenure and 
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security of office, and with the necessity to the maintenance of the 
Rule of Law that there be an organized and independent legal 
profession. The concern, in other words, is not to impose limita-
tions, but rather to protect the judiciary against incursion and co-
ercion from the other branches. 
One might gain the impression from this and similar state-
ments that the Rule of Law had been defined primarily in terms of 
ultimate rule by Ia-vryers and judges; that an independent judiciary 
with the final say in disputes between individuals, and between 
individuals and government, is itself the objective which we seek 
to achieve and maintain; that the phrase "Rule of Law," in other 
words, refers to an arrangement whereby independent judges hold 
the check-reins on government, rather than to the extent to which 
law, as any kind of a system of prescriptions concerning human 
conduct, enters into and influences the conduct of officials. There 
is a curious variance between the content of the idea, so elaborated, 
and the literal meaning of the words chosen for its expression. That 
variance suggests inquiry. 
The words, in their literal meaning, suggest not the judges 
but the law as the ultimate reference. At one time that conception 
would have been thought quite natural. It is epitomized, perhaps 
in an extreme form, by Marshall's statement, "Judicial power, as 
contradistinguished from the power of laws, has no existence. 
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing."1 
The statement sounds quaint to modem ears, but I wonder whether 
we can dispense completely with the judicial mores which it sug-
gests, metaphorically to be sure. 
What is this peculiar virtue of the judicial method which sets 
the judiciary apart to be specially protected and left to act without 
inhibition from other officials? Judicial procedures of course may 
be praised for their own virtues. They aim to achieve that quality 
of fairness between the parties which is represented by the idea of 
entitlement to a day in court and to an independent and impartial 
tribunal. Over and above this principle of fair treatment, however, 
contemporary commentators seem to hesitate to find any stronger 
implications in the Rule of Law idea than that a judicial decision 
should be "reasoned, rationally justified, in terms that take due 
account both of the demands of general principle and the demands 
of the particular situation."2 I find myself unable to believe that 
these aspects of judicial procedure are the basic reasons why we 
1 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824). 
2 Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 143, 145 (1958). 
504 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
instinctively call for the judge when individual claims and interests 
are at stake; why we are adamant that he should be left entirely 
alone; why we expect him to come fonvard as the final arbiter in 
any dispute between citizen and officialdom. The judiciary has no 
copyright upon its procedures, which could easily be utilized by 
other branches on appropriate occasions. Is it not, rather, that the 
procedures are subservient to the end which is sought, the resolu-
tion of the claim in accordance with pre-established criteria? If so, 
the true reason why judicial proceedings are held in such high 
regard is found in that brief, almost parenthetical reference in the 
Declaration of Delhi, which I have already quoted, namely that 
with all his independence "the judge is not entitled to act in an 
arbitrary manner. His duty is to interpret the law and the funda-
mental principles and assumptions that underlie it" - a proposi-
tion which is not really so far from Marshall's after all. The judge 
is made independent of the pressures of the moment so that he 
can apply the law. 
The individual members of a society of any size must neces-
sarily yield to an individual or a small group the function of estab-
lishing the framework of the society, and of laying down general 
rules to direct the future action of persons within the society so that 
that framework can be maintained. It is apparent in a democrat-
ically controlled society that this procedure must be based on give 
and take, compromise, and an adjustment of the desires of many 
persons and classes of persons, but that decisions must ultimately 
be taken by the empowered group. The legitimacy of the decisions 
rests upon the authority of the group making the selection, and can 
rest on nothing else. 
When policy has been in existence, however, a feeling arises 
that the individual has a right to the correct application of that 
policy to his particular situation. When one person's desires run 
counter to those of another in a context in which it can be argued 
that certain established policies are relevant, then in the eyes of 
the persons affected the legitimacy of the decision which prefers 
the one over the other no longer rests upon the authority of the 
decider. They will be less interested in the wisdom of the decision 
than in its correctness. Which is only to say that men believe in the 
depths of their beings that they have rights, that those rights are 
described by law, and that although their rights must from time to 
time be determined, they should not in the process be affected by 
the fiat of any person. Sir John Salmond put his finger on this 
point in the following comment: 
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"One of the chief advantages derived from the maintenance 
of a body of fixed legal rules which are not subject to the 
'arbitrium' of its administration is that on this basis rests the 
prestige and power of the administration of justice. The law 
is impartial. It has no respect of persons. Just or unjust, wise 
or foolish, it is the same for all, and for this reason men readily 
submit to its arbitrament. In the application and enforcement 
of a fixed and predetermined rule, alike for all and not made 
for or regarding his own case alone, a man will willingly 
acquiesce. But to the 'ipse dixit' of a court, however just or 
impartial, men are not so constituted as to afford the same 
ready obedience and respect."3 
The subject which I want to investigate today, then, is the connec-
tion between the literal meaning of the words "Rule of Law" and 
the behavior of judges; law as an external control over judicial 
decision; the rule of law from the standpoint of the substantive law, 
so to speak. Until recent years there was a traditional explanation 
of this connection which was accepted with little question by the 
great majority of American Ia-\vyers. It would have been consistent 
with Marshall's statement quoted above, that is, it would have 
pictured law as the governor and the judge as mere agent. Such a 
view, which seeks to eliminate judicial will from the picture en-
tirely, seems to require a conception of law as being at any time a 
complete and existing system. It has not all been expressed in 
words, but it is all there, nevertheless, and the judge has but one 
function, which is to find the law and apply it to the facts. It is the 
law which governs us therefore, rather than the judge, who serves 
only as a selector mechanism to determine which is the correct 
rule for the disposition of the case. 
Any thoughtful person will detect in this conception a large 
element of fiction. It is enough to suggest Gray's ironic comment, 
"What was the law in the time of Richard Coeur de Lion on the 
liability of a telegraph company to the persons to whom a message 
was sent?"4 Since I do not believe that the la,vyers who existed 
prior to the last two generations were by any means so dull a lot as 
a contrary conclusion would indicate, I am also inclined to doubt 
that it is sound to think of it as a conscious attempt at scientific 
description. It did, however, represent a view which at one time 
was generally held as to the attitude which the judge should bring 
8 SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD, The Modem Legal Philosophy Series. Introduction by 
John W. Salmond, p. 1xxxi (1921). 
4 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF TilE LAW 96 (1909). 
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to his task; that it should be his objective to deal with the case 
before him in that way which was indicated by an interpretation of 
existing authorities, rather than in that way which seemed to him 
on the facts to be the fairest or most desirable from a social point 
of view. It called for the subordination of his judgment to that of 
the collectivity of his predecessors, for a primary reliance on a 
reasoned extrapolation of accumulated experience. 
This view of matters, as you well know, has undergone exten-
sive criticism in recent decades. The criticism has pertained to the 
conception or definition of law, to the description of judicial 
activity, and to the concept of judicial obligation which are im-
plicit in it. Viewed in perspective, the criticism was a continuation 
of an earlier debate, and accounted for the final phase in the 
Descent of the Law, which had once been viewed as a system of 
precepts having, according to one's bent, either a supernatural or 
a natural authority, but is now conceived by some to exist only 
in case-by-case incarnations. 
The observations of the pragmatic critics have greatly increased 
understanding of the judicial process. They have been absorbed 
into contemporary legal thought, and it is not likely that they will 
soon be dislodged. In the end, however, they do not seem to have 
accounted satisfactorily for the influence which law exerts on the 
decision of a case. Part of the difficulty, I believe, was that the 
· debate became preoccupied with the relationship between rules 
and law and rules and decisions. It was proved many times that as 
Holmes so gruffly put it, "General propositions do not decide con-
crete cases."5 This comment loses some of its sting when one con-
siders that for the common-law lawyer at least, the law does not 
consist of a set of general propositions. General propositions, 
those which could sensibly be described as "rules," make up only 
the crudest framework of the law, and are likely to be only short-
hand labels for results. The general language is only the starting 
point for analysis, for the fact situation which is the case is always 
much more complex than the rule. The content of any rule is 
known in detail only after all cases in which it has been accepted or 
rejected as a statement of the result are known and compared with 
the case at hand. The mere fact that the "rule" does not give the 
answer, therefore, does not mean that the decision has not been con-
trolled by law, for the case is decided according to law so long as 
it is decided consistently with past instances. 
5 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905). 
1961] RULE OF LAW AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 507 
But there is a more fundamental difficulty. It appears in our 
habits of speech, and for that reason is most difficult to exorcise. 
It is apparent in the phrase which has been made the theme for 
this series of lectures, for the expression "Rule of Law" is most 
outrageously elliptical, if it is anything more than metaphor. Law 
in itself cannot rule or control anything or anybody. Whatever 
it is, it is a causal factor in any event only because men refer to it 
and use it as a guide to their conduct. It consists only of ideas, 
some of which are written down, others of which are not to be 
found any place in ·writing, but occur to the trained laivyer or the 
judge when he studies those which have been written down. De-
spite all this, we habitually speak of the law doing this and the law 
doing that, as if it were a person or an active force. We speak of 
rules of law, legal rights and legal duties as if they were observable 
facts, as if they had an existence outside the minds of men. This 
thought pattern, which attempts to make a thing or a person out of 
a mere thought, easily leads to disillusion, for it is quickly recog-
nized that every event which is habitually ascribed to the law is 
actually the product of the mind, the will and the act of some 
identifiable human being. It may then be concluded that the im-
portance of the law has been overemphasized, that its influence is 
largely fictitious, that it should not be permitted to stand in the way 
of a solution which, to the mind of the judge, would be superior 
from the point of view of practical considerations, and that a more 
rewarding subject for study may be the chemistry of the human 
beings who have the power to make decisions which affect the in-
terests of other human beings: in other words, that the basic prob-
lem of the law is a personnel problem. 
Although the law consists solely of ideas, the great bulk of those 
ideas are already given when the particular judge or Ia-ivyer comes 
upon the scene. They are found in an extensive literature with 
which he has learned to work, and are ideas concerning action 
under various circumstances which, because they are derived from 
that literature, members of the community, including the judg~s, 
consider to be binding upon themselves and upon others. Though 
they are commonly called "rules" they are far more complex than 
that name would suggest. The feeling of obligation, rather than 
the verbal form in which they appear, is their most important char-
acteristic. Without it they would be totally ineffective. Your legal 
"rights," including those which are regarded most basic, are noth-
ing more than complexes of these ideas, and are therefore entirely 
dependent upon this feeling of obligation, operating upon your 
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neighbor to induce him not to "invade your rights," and upon 
officials and judges to induce them to exert the coercive power 
which they have at their disposal if he does. The feeling of obliga-
tion does its most significant work by minimizing the necessity for 
that coercive power to be used. It is also this feeling of obligation 
which controls the actions of officials so that they do not become 
oppressors. 
The literal content of the phrase "Rule of Law," then, has prob-
ably been misleading, for it misplaces the responsibility. It sug-
gests that the law is the active factor, and the judge merely passive 
instrument, which is transparently not the case. The judge is 
obviously the actor; he is not controlled in any physical sense; at 
most he responds to a feeling of obligation to decide the case in such 
a way that the decision will be consistent with the ideas which he 
finds in the existing authoritative literature, which is precisely 
the same motivating factor as that which activates any layman 
presented with a choice between two courses of conduct, one of 
which he deems to be illegal. On the other hand, if the system is 
to work at all that feeling of obligation must be preserved. There 
must be a theory at least that by a proper examination of the ma-
terials one can find an imperative solution. It must be assumed 
that the materials establish a pattern of conduct to which the in-
dividual, be he citizen or official, is "bound" to adhere. If it is 
not, then the result seems inescapable that - not the judges - but 
the individual judge becomes the measure of all things, for judges 
as a group have no way of reaching consensus, and if they did, their 
contemporary consensus could be no more binding upon individual 
judges than that which exists by virtue of past decisions. 
The point which a realistic examination of the facts makes clear, 
then, is not that there can be no "Rule of Law," in the sense in 
which I have been using the term, so far as the judicial process is 
concerned, but is rather the extent to which the realization of this 
ideal depends upon judicial discipline, upon a desire by judges and 
other officials, a feeling on their part of compulsion or obligation. 
Without that feeling there would in fact be no external control 
over the judge's decision, and our judicial government would har-
bor within itself the same faults which the judges have so long 
sought to guard against in the other branches. 
This discipline has proved in the past to be a rugged growth, 
but it can be destroyed. Judge Hutcheson saw this twenty years 
ago when he said: 
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"I think the probable source of the only danger we have to 
fear from the court today is the . . . too complete acceptance 
of Gray's notion that judges don't find the law like they do 
the eggs on Easter Day, that they make it like the legislatures 
do, against Blackstone's and Carter's, that they find it. When 
you have that notion in mind very strongly and everybody 
lets you talk out in meeting and say, decisions are in reality 
legislation, a great many judges want to be legislating and not 
just judging. . . . [I]f this idea is run into the ground and 
you get to a place where you have the power to legislate, ad-
minister and adjudicate at the same time, and all from the 
same bench, like Brer' Fox said to Brer' Rabbit, 'You is get-
ting to be a mighty big man - too big.' " 6 
The process by which the ideas of which the law consists are 
originated and given their imperative nature has generally been 
called "legislation." The term includes at one extreme the estab-
lishment of policy in the broadest terms, the writing of the master 
plan for the society, and at the other the promulgation of regula-
tions in the picayune detail of the building codes. The difference 
in function at these two extremes is so great that one might have 
expected a difference in nomenclature to have developed. It has, 
of course, been recognized in connection with the division of labor 
between legislative and administrative bodies. It appears, however, 
to be growing ever more vague along the frontier between courts 
and legislatures. It is characteristic of our system that the great 
bulk of the law relating to private rights and duties was left to the 
origination of judges. They started with crude ideas which they 
redefined and elaborated over many generations to produce the 
body of doctrine with which the Anglo-American Ia-vvyer now 
works. The process continues, and it is inevitable that it should. 
Each case that is brought to court and decided adds a new detail to 
the legal idea which the court uses for its disposition - a detail 
which was not there before. Recent generations of legal scholars 
have scorned the assumption of their predecessors that the process 
involves merely an uncovering of pre-existing principles, and have 
made much of the point that it is legislative in character. Few 
today would dispute that characterization, taking into account its 
generality, which is so gross, however, that the characterization is 
remarkably unenlightening. If it refers only to the fact that a large 
6 Comments at the Cincinnati Conference on Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent, 
14 u. CrNC. L. REv. 203,248 (1940). 
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body of doctrine exists today which had no existence a thousand 
years ago, and that the bulk of it is attributable to the innovation 
of judges, it merely states the obvious. Aside from this, however, it 
is possible from our vantage point in time to look back over the 
centuries and pick out numerous instances of judicial decisions 
which were by no means required by existing authority and which 
became entirely new stocks of descent, so that it can be argued that 
they changed the shape of the law in major respects. I would ven-
ture the guess that in very few of those instances could the decid-
ing court foresee the implications which would ultimately be found 
in his decision; in very few instances, therefore, was it felt that 
the decision was a major departure, and that the court was assuming 
responsibility for societal planning in any substantial respect. 
Such notions, once they have gained wide acceptance, are likely 
to be taken seriously, however. This one, derived from a history 
of casual common law growth, has served to encourage arguments 
favoring changes in the law addressed to lawyers and judges rather 
than to legislators in the interest of broad programs of law reform, 
and as an entering wedge for the acceptance of these arguments by 
the judges. Without regard to the merits of these programs, if they 
are accepted by judges as guides for decision, then in my opinion 
there will have been a significant change in the mechanics of gov-
ernment. The change is subtle; it has occurred or is occurring 
gradually, and would be difficult to identify, for it is in large part 
only a change in attitude, in the degree of judicial commitment to 
the idea that pre-existing law should govern decisions. Practical 
consequences will be clear only after a period of years has expired. 
I shall therefore leave it to you from your own consciousness of 
judicial attitudes to say whether that change is taking place. If it 
is, when it is coupled with our codeless tradition, the result may be 
the assumption by judges of a major segment of the planning func-
tion in our society. This is a point which I believe non-Ia-wyer stu-
dents of politics do not fully appreciate. They have come perforce 
to recognize the extent to which a court can remould a constitution 
or a statute in its own image. How many non-Ia-wyers, however, 
comprehend the vastness of the reaches of the common law, the ex-
tent to which the daily workings of the social machine are regulated 
by the deposit of past judicial decisions rather than by enacted law, 
and the potential importance, therefore, of a general judicial at-
titude that that which judges have done may also by judges be un-
done? 
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The most obvious comment upon such a development is that it 
works a basic alteration in the relationship between people and 
government by the will of the officials concerned, with no review by 
any other body, no reference to the people, and probably, because 
of the esoteric nature of the change, without widespread knowledge 
that it has occurred. Conflicts between court and legislature or 
court and executive make the headlines, and are subjected to ex-
haustive criticism. There is little drama, however, and less public-
ity, when the court changes a traditional rule of the common law. 
Any debate which may take place rarely extends beyond the ranks 
of the profession. But aside from this point, which relates to the 
assumption of significant powers by a governing group without 
authorization by the governed, what can be said about the merits 
of a system in which the judges are given the major responsibility 
for law reform, at least in fields not expressly pre-empted by the 
legislature? 
Such an arrangement has been praised for the reason that it is 
said to bring to bear upon the problems of private law the special 
governing expertise of the judiciary. The judge, it is suggested, 
is in a peculiarly strategic position to recognize developing needs 
and keep the law responsive to them. This is a point at which I 
must confess bafflement. It seems to be assumed by this argument, 
much as it was once assumed about the law, that "social needs" are 
objectively determinable, that they can be observed and knmm, 
that the judge's function, therefore, is to uncover them and use 
them as guides for decision. If this assumption were sound, it 
would still seem that the needs which ought to be served arise out 
of developments in a world to which the judge is an outsider, a 
mere onlooker. He has no special source of worldly knowledge, and 
no apparatus for gathering the factual information essential to the 
formation of intelligent decisions of a forward-looking, policy-
making, society-shaping variety. If he were to take the time to make 
his own investigation, it could only be at the expense of the press-
ing needs of the litigants on his already crowded docket. Without 
independent investigation he must act on the basis of arguments 
presented by counsel for the parties who happen to be engaged in 
litigation before him. The ultimate social implications of those 
arguments can scarcely be the responsibility of the advocates if the 
purposes of the adversary method are to be maintained. Conse-
quently the judge's basis for action, typically, is not an objective 
view of the situation in its social context, but rather, two opposite, 
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extreme, and slanted views. This may be an adequate basis for the 
decision of disputes between individual parties each of whom has 
had a fair chance under controlled conditions to present the best 
reasons why he should prevail. It can hardly be advanced as an 
ideal milieu for policy making. 
More basic than this objection, however, is the fact that social 
needs are no more real, discoverable objects than is the law. An 
investigation will not identify them because they do not exist. It is 
grossly misleading to conceive of the judge as a sculptor who sits 
at his bench to mould the law so that its lines are congruent with 
an object before him, called "social needs." The minds of indi-
vidual human beings harbor many desires. In the nature of things 
not all of them can be satisfied. So that some can be, others must 
be frustrated. What we are discussing is simply this - whether 
those persons who are from time to time placed in judicial office 
shall have the power to make the master choices between those 
desires which may be satisfied and those which must be frustrated. 
If the conception is maintained that the important choices, those 
which affect whole classes of persons, should be made in legislative 
halls, they will be worked out by a bargaining process. The persons 
who have the desires, or advocates for their positions, will be heard. 
Their arguments may very probably be selfishly motivated, and 
will no doubt be valued quite frankly in political terms. Deals will 
be struck, adjustments made, and in the end there will be a com-
promise solution which can secure the consent of a majority of the 
legislative representatives selected by those who will be subject 
to it. The result may be esthetically or even morally offensive, 
and extremely frustrating to selfless reformers who have been able 
to construct for themselves an ideal master plan for society. I have 
the impression, however, that these are the implications of pop-
ularly elected, representative government. 
To me, then, the phrase "Rule of Law" as applied to the 
judicial process stands for more than a guarantee of fair play, more 
than a hands-off attitude toward certain of the more highly intel-
lectualized desires of men, more than a stipulation that private dis-
putes shall be disposed of on a reasoned basis. In addition to these 
tremendously important values, it suggests a whole complex of 
ideas concerning the function of the judge, his attitude toward the 
law, and the relationship between law and decision. I have no 
illusions that the law can furnish a mechanical control over the 
behavior of the judge, however enthusiastic he may be for the idea 
that he should be or is so controlled. I am fully aware of the fact 
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that a respectable legal argument can be made on both sides of 
almost any question sufficiently vexing to come before a judge at 
all, and that certainty in advance of decision can therefore never be 
achieved. I am content with the knowledge that law in the long run 
is only a branch or a special manifestation of morals, fitted out with 
some enforcement machinery which works only imperfectly at best, 
but which would break down completely in the absence of a desire 
to obey responded to by individuals. If this is the basis for its 
effectiveness so far as people generally are concerned, then there 
is no reason why judges should not be similarly affected, and the 
proposition which has been maintained that a "government of laws 
and not of men" is a fiction, impossible of attainment, results from 
a misinterpretation of the metaphor which that expression is. 
The Rule of Law is at most an ideal. It can neither be 
demonstrated nor enforced, but only advocated. It can, however, 
be destroyed by too thoroughgoing and too widespread a skepti-
cism. I do not mean, of course, that the better understanding of 
realities which exists because of the critical writing of the past fifty 
years can or should be suppressed. It would seem, however, that 
the judge who has discovered the freedom and the power which are 
his should be chastened rather than elated by the discovery. It is 
possible to harbor this knowledge without deriving from it the 
conclusion that the judge should convert himself into a ruler, a 
manipulator of those who have reposed in him a very special trust. 
Hayek has recently said, "If the ideal of the rule of law is a firm 
element of public opinion, legislation and jurisdiction will tend to 
approach it more and more closely. But if it is represented as an 
impracticable and even undesirable ideal and people cease to strive 
for its realization, it will rapidly disappear."7 
I have one further comment before I subside. My argument 
has been that the judiciary is not equipped and has not by the peo-
ple been authorized to undertake an advance planning function for 
the law, and through law for society. In the past it was perhaps not 
essential that such a function be undertaken by anybody. History 
moved slowly enough that the accretionary change and growth of 
the common law, supplemented in sensitive areas by enacted law, 
took care of newly-developing human desires satisfactorily enough. 
It may be that the pressures of galloping technological development 
7 HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 206 (1960). I should like also to acknowledge 
indebtedness to CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION (1952), LUNDSTEDT, LEGAL THINKING REVISED 
(1956), and OLIVECRONA, LAw AS FAcr (1939), all of which have been extremely helpful to 
me. 
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and population growth have so altered the basic situation that this 
is no longer true. One does not readily conclude that our legis-
latures, as currently constituted, are ideal instrumentalities for 
keeping the law abreast of the times. An earnest belief on the 
part of many students of the law that it is in some respects inade-
quate and outmoded, coupled with a feeling of discouragement 
when the prospect of legislative change is contemplated, puts 
increasing pressure upon the judges to assume the responsibility 
and the burden of law reform. Proposals for technical law reform 
rarely excite interest among legislators, and it may be that there 
are very important needs in our society which, because they are dis-
persed and have no organizational nucleus, are not adequately 
voiced. It is quite probable, then, that further attention should be 
given to the possibility and design of some special organ of the 
legislative branch to which arguments for reform could be ad-
dressed for careful and serious study and recommendation. That, 
however, would be the subject for another lecture. 
